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Abstract—This paper focuses on detecting anomalies in a digi-
tal video broadcasting (DVB) system from providers’ perspective.
We learn a probabilistic deterministic real timed automaton
profiling benign behavior of encryption control in the DVB
control access system. This profile is used as a one-class classifier.
Anomalous items in a testing sequence are detected when the
sequence is not accepted by the learned model.
Index Terms—anomaly detection, digital video broadcasting
system, real-time automaton
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays proliferation of accessible data stream happens
through various networks such as broadcasting, web page, mo-
bile phone, etc. The large volume and continuously real-time
updating characteristics of data streams pose challenges for
studying and mining. This work focuses on profiling normal
behavior from encryption control stream data generated by a
digital video broadcasting (DVB) system. From a providers’
perspective, such a profile provides insights about the process
generating the data and it can be used for anomaly detection.
A. Digital Video Broadcasting system
The DVB has been adopted in Europe as an open standard
for a long time. The DVB standard defines both physical and
data link layers for a variety of subsystems, e.g., satellite,
cable, terrestrial television, and microwave. Furthermore, the
DVB standard formulates how multiple program data are
distributed and transported among protocols in format of the
MPEG Transport Stream (MPEG-TS). Readers are referred
to the official website of the DVB project for more detailed
specifications1.
The objective of our research lies on a core security com-
ponent of the DVB, i.e., the control access system. Figure 1
shows how the control access system works from a customer’s
side. The TS is received from the satellite through the tuner
and arrives at the DVB descrambler. The content of the TS
is scrambled with a 48-bit secret key, also known as the
control word (CW). The CW is further encrypted into an
entitlement control message (ECM). Meanwhile an entitlement
management message (EMM) contains the authorization for
decrypting the ECM. A demultiplexer extracts the ECM and
1https://www.dvb.org/standards
Fig. 1. Example of the control access system from the consumer’s side [1].
the EMM from the TS. Valid smart cards are able to decrypt
the EMM in order to access the authorization and decrypt the
ECM. The decrypted ECM is used to descramble the TS into
MPEG-2. The MPEG-2 contains video/audio/context, which
is transported to users.
B. Related Work
Anomalies are usually considered as outliers, surprises,
exceptions, noises, and novelties [2]. Anomaly detection can
be achieved by many pattern recognition techniques. However,
in many domains, e.g., medical and financial area, frauds
or anomalies detection should be understandable and inter-
pretable. A key reason being that the learned knowledge
should be validated by humans before being used. We provide
a brief literature review of anomaly detection using language
models since they are one of the most understandable models.
Lin and et al. represent time series using the Symbolic
Aggregate approXimation (SAX) [3], and then use a context-
free grammar for rules’ generation [4]. Intuitively, anoma-
lies tend to have low grammar density (novelty patterns are
less compressed). Sekar and et al. learn program behaviors
from system call sequences using a finite-state automaton for
intrusion detection [5]. Timo and et al. propose a tailored
behavior model (a probabilistic deterministic timed-transition
automaton) to identify anomalies [6]. They first augment the
learned automaton with timing information, after which traces
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of ATM observations are traversed by the model. Aggregated
transition probabilities are then compared with a predeter-
mined threshold for detecting anomalies.
In this paper, we study event sequences from a DVB system.
These sequences contain the encryption information needed
for viewing the stream content. We model these sequences
using PDRTAs (Probabilistic Deterministic Real Timed Au-
tomata), which we learn unsupervised from a set of input
sequences using the RTI+ algorithm (Real-Time Identification
from Positive Data) [7]. first, we compute the time difference
between two consecutive and distinct events to obtain timed
strings. We then segment the time strings into frames. The
sequences are fed into the RTI+ algorithm to learn a timed
automaton. In the testing phrase, an anomaly of a sequence is
identified if the sequence is not accepted by the learned model.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one
using a timed automaton to detect anomalies in the DVB
system. Two types of anomalies, i.e., data lost and timing
error, are identified with low false positive rate.
• The model provides highly interpretable insights for
understanding the underlying process generating the data.
Experts from the DVB area can easily monitor and
validate the system under operation using such a model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the
data preprocessing. Section III discusses the learning algorithm
and the experimental results. We make concluding remarks in
Section IV.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
An encryption scheme sequence (ESS) is abstracted from
the monitoring records of the MPEG-TS. It is essentially
a discrete event sequence of ECM streaming in the control
access system.
The alphabet of the ESS is {A,B, 0, 1}. The symbols A
and B abstractly stand for two ECMs containing an even and
an odd key, respectively. The symbols 0 and 1 are even and
odd encryption modes. According to expert knowledge, some
known rules are the following:
1) An ESS starts from As, followed by 1s, Bs, then ends
with 0s. A complete encryption scheme consists of two
aforementioned sequences.
2) The number of symbols are not fixed in an ESS. How-
ever, the amount of As is always equal to that of Bs.
So are the paired events of 1s and 0s.
We can use a simple regular expression to generate the
aforementioned rules: (A{m}1{n}B{m}0{n}){2}, where m
and n are the legitimate numbers for an ECM pair (A/B) and
an encryption mode pair (1/0). Basically there are two kinds
of anomalies in practice of the DVB. The first one is data lost
and the other one is timing error, e.g., too large or too small
time delay.
III. METHODS AND RESULTS
In this section, we will deploy a language model, i.e.,
a timed automaton for anomaly detection. Timed automata
explicitly model the underlying varying-duration behavior of
ESS streaming.
A. RTI+
Time constrains are implicit in conventional discrete event
systems, e.g., n-grams or hidden Markov models. However,
time information is often important for modeling the behavior
of such systems. An algorithm for efficient learning of timed
automata algorithm named RTI+ (Real-Time Identification
from Positive Data) was proposed by [7]. Discrete events are
represented by timed strings (a1, t1)(a2, t2) · · · (an, tn), where
ai is a discrete event occurring with ti time delay since the
i−1th event. A PDRTA (probabilistic deterministic real timed
automaton) model defines a probability distribution over such
timed strings, having a Markov property in the distribution
over events, and a semi-Markov property in the time guards.
Definition 1: A probabilistic DRTA (PDRTA) A is a
quadruple 〈A′, H, S, T 〉, where A′ = 〈Q,Σ,∆, q0〉 is a
DRTA without final states, H is a finite set of bins (time
intervals) [v, v′], v, v′ ∈ N, known as the histogram, S
is a finite set of symbol probability distributions Sq =
Pr(S = a | q) | a ∈ Σ, q ∈ Q, and T is a finite set of time-bin
probability distributions Tq = Pr(T ∈ h | q) | h ∈ H, q ∈ Q.
In a PDRTA, the state transition is triggered when both the
event and the time guard are satisfied.
Table I is an example of how to obtain a timed string.
Raw data is formatted in tuples of a symbol and a timestamp.
In timed strings, time delay between events represents event
transition intervals. Note that since only integer format time
is readable for RTI+, the original float time with precision
microseconds need to be rounded. An interesting problem what
precision (different level of magnification) is “optimal” when
learning the time guards. A large magnification intuitively
makes time guards more sensitive. We will conduct several
comparative trials to find a good precision in the experimental
part.
Algorithm 1 Data identification with RTI+:
Input: A (multi-)set of timed strings S+
Output: A small PDRTA A for S+
Construct a timed prefix A tree from S+, let Q′ = ∅;
for all transitions δ = 〈q, q′, a, [m,m′]〉 from A, do
Evaluate all possible merges of q′ with states from Q′;
Evaluate all possible splits of δ;
if the lowest split p-value< 0.05 then
perform this split;
end
else if the highest merge p-value> 0.05 then
perform this merge;
end
else
add q to Q′;
end
end
TABLE I
DATA PREPROCESSING
Original Data A, 0 A, 1 A, 3 1, 13 1, 13 B, 15 B, 15 B, 16 0, 16 0, 17
Time String (A, 0) (A, 1) (A, 2) (1, 10) (1, 0) (B, 2) (B, 0) (B, 1) (0, 0) (0, 1)
B. model interpretation
We print out the automaton learned using RTI+ from the
DVB data in Figure 2. All the states are depicted using circles.
The arcs represent transitions between the states. A transition
is triggered when both an event and its timing are valid (inside
a time guard). The event and the timing, along with their
probability and occurrence, are printed next to the arc. The
sink state named S is generated due to some strings with very
low occurrence (less then 5). Some interesting knowledge is
discovered in such a insightful and structural model.
1) Loops indicate the cycling behavior of sending ESSs.
For example the path S0-S1-S2-S3-S4-S5-...S4-S5 can
be expressed as: (A{3}1{2}B{3}0{2})+.
2) Without considering the time information, the legitimate
rule can be drawn as (A{3-6}1{2}B{3-6}0{2})+.
3) RTI+ splits at some states, e.g., S0 for distinct
time guards: [0, 20], [21, 23], and [24, 25]. RTI+ splits
the time in a transition to pull apart distinguished
tails. Take the two sequences sharing same sym-
bolic rules (A{5}1{2}B{5}0{2})+: S0-S26-S27-S44-
S45-S46-...S41-S26 and S0-S42-S43-S51-...S59-S60 for
instance, they are distinguished as low and high delay
behaviors (loops) of sending the first ECM key: A.
This type of information indicates the possible varying-
duration properties of the system, which deserves a
further verification by the DVB experts.
C. result
The training set contains 280 sequences in total. In the
testing phrase, we collect two data sets having a data lost
and a timing error, respectively. The number of sequence in
each of them is 29. Anomalous items in a sequence will be
reported if such a sequence is not accepted by this model.
The Table II and III show the results of data lost and time
delay testing data set. True positive (TP), false negative (FN),
false positive (FP), and true negative (TN) are listed in the
tables. Their corresponding rates i.e., TPR, FNR, FPR, TNR,
and accuracy (ACC) are computed as well.
We compare three levels of magnification 10, 103, and 106
for determining good time precision. The results show that the
precision with 106 times scaling performs best. We suggest to
well address this problem by comparative trials in practice.
The false positive is caused by the sink state in our model,
i.e., because RTI+ does not handle transitions that occur very
infrequently. The sequences firing these transitions provide too
little information for RTI+ to obtain reliable statistical tests for
computing merge and split scores. To avoid this problem, we
suggest to check strings in the training data as well as the
model. If it does exist in the training data, even though it
traverses to a sink state, we can label it as normal behavior to
reduce the false positives.
Two anomalous sequences from the DVB system are listed
as follows.
• Data lost:(1, 300), (1, 0), (B, 22), (B, 0), (B, 2), (B, 0),
(0, 276), (0, 0), (A, 22), (A, 0), (A, 2), (A, 0), (1, 276),
(1, 0), (B, 22), (B, 0), (B, 2), (B, 0), (0, 276), (0, 0)
• Time delay: (A, 22), (A, 0), (A, 2), (A, 275), (1, 0), (1,
0), (B, 22), (B, 0), (B, 2), (B, 0), (0, 275), (0, 0), (A, 22),
(A, 0), (A, 2), (A, 0), (1, 275), (1, 0), (B, 22), (B, 0), (B,
3), (B, 0), (0, 275), (0, 0)
The first sequence misses As in the beginning, which leads to
a failure triggering the following transitions at the start state.
TIn the second sequence, the 4th A is outside the valid time
guard [0, 0].
TP FN FP TN TPR FNR FPR TNR ACC
10 1 0 1 27 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.97
103 1 0 6 22 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.79 0.79
106 1 0 0 28 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
TABLE II
THE RESULT OF THREE AUTOMATA WHEN TESTING DATA LOST ANOMALY
TP FN FP TN TPR FNR FPR TNR ACC
10 1 0 1 27 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.96
103 1 0 5 23 1.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.83
106 1 0 1 27 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.96
TABLE III
THE RESULT OF THREE AUTOMATA WHEN TESTING TIME DELAY ANOMALY
IV. CONCLUSION
We learn a benign behavioral profile using RTI+. Such a
generative model provides insights for the ESSs screaming
process. The knowledge we discover is consistent with that of
the experts from the DVB system area. In addition, our model
provides the valid timing in each transition for behavior dura-
tion verification. The experiments demonstrate that our model
has high accuracy in anomaly detection. Another advantage
of our model is that it is efficient for real-time application
because the verification is just firing transitions in our model,
which is polynomial in time.
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Fig. 2. Experimental process based on RTI+
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